Incontinence / lack of self restraint is different from intemperance / licentiousness. The intemperate or licentious man is habitually disposed to seeking after excessive pleasures (to do with taste and touch). He decides that he should seek after pleasures that are in fact shameful and does so without regret. The incontinent man, however, realises that he shouldn’t seek such pleasures but he is overcome by his passions in the moment and does so anyway.
The question arises whether the incontinent man sins. Although, intemperance is a worse sin, St Thomas affirms that he does (IIa IIae Q.156 a.2).
One objection has to do with power over one’s actions.
Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wisdom 8:21, "I know [Vulgate: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Another has to do with the involvement of reason in sin.
Objection 2. Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Reading Aristotle’s account of continence and incontinence (Nic. Eth. VII), where he explains what I described above, one might come away thinking these objections have merit. However, St Thomas replies decisively to these important objections.
Reply to Objection 1. Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing." Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."
Reply to Objection 2. The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
Further to the the reply to the second objection, we can add a saying of St Augustine, quoted by the Council of Trent: “God never commands the impossible, but, in commanding, He warns us to do what we are able and to ask Him for help to do that which we cannot” (Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. 11 (Denzinger, no. 804), from St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 41, no. 50.) This also reminds us what Jesus Christ said to St Paul: sufficit tibi gratia mea. “My grace is sufficient for you” (2 Corinthians 12:9). And again St Paul (1 Corinthians 10:13) says “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able: but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it.”
Furthermore, while the sin of the incontinent man is not as bad as the sin of the licentious man, that does not mean that it is venial, while that of the licentious man is mortal. In fact, the sin of the incontinent man or a sin of frailty can be mortal. While antecedent passion diminishes culpability, it does not destroy it (and on the contrary, consequent passion proper to the licentious man augments culpability). One can fully consent to the passion where one was free to utilise means that would have impeded it before giving into the passion. Garrigou-Lagrange explains in the Three Ages of the Interior Life:
“... But we must distinguish here the so-called antecedent passion, which precedes the consent of the will, and that called consequent, which follows it. Antecedent passion diminishes culpability, for it diminishes the liberty of judgment and of voluntary choice; it is particularly apparent in very impressionable people. On the contrary, consequent or voluntary passion does not lessen the gravity of sin, but augments it; or rather it is a sign that the sin is more voluntary, since the will itself arouses this inordinate movement of passion, as happens in a man who wishes to become angry the better to manifest his ill will. Just as a good consequent passion, such as Christ’s holy anger when He was driving the merchants from the Temple, increases the merit, so an evil consequent passion augments the demerit.
The sin of frailty, of which we are speaking here, is that in which the will yields to the impulse of an antecedent passion; and thereby the gravity of the sin is lessened. This does not mean, however, that it is never a mortal sin. It is truly mortal when the matter is grievous, and the sinner yields to passion with advertence and full consent. This is the case of homicide committed under the impulse of anger.
A person can resist, especially at the beginning, the inordinate movement of passion. If he does not resist it at the beginning as he ought, if he does not pray as he ought to obtain the help of God, passion is no longer simply antecedent, it becomes voluntary.
The sin of frailty, even when serious and mortal, is more pardonable than another, but here “pardonable” is by no means a synonym for “venial” in the current meaning of this word.
Even pious people ought to be attentive to this point for they may have unrepressed movements of jealousy which may lead them to grave faults: for example, to serious rash judgments and to words and exterior acts which are the cause of profound breaches, contrary both to justice and to charity.
It would be a gross error to think that only the sin of malice can be mortal because it alone implies the sufficient advertence, the full consent, together with the serious matter, necessary for the sin which gives death to the soul and renders it worthy of eternal death. Such an error would result from a badly formed conscience, and would contribute to increase this deformity. Let us remember that we can easily resist the beginning of the inordinate movement of passion, and that it is a duty for us to do so and also to pray for help, according to the words of St. Augustine, quoted by the Council of Trent:“God never commands the impossible, but, in commanding, He warns us to do what we are able and to ask Him for help to do that which we cannot.”
Let us add to this description of Garrigou-Lagrange what Our Lord Jesus Christ says about the efficacy of prayer in Luke Chapter 11:
And I say to you, Ask, and it shall be given you: seek, and you shall find: knock, and it shall be opened to you. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. And which of you, if he ask his father bread, will he give him a stone? or a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent? Or if he shall ask an egg, will he reach him a scorpion? If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him?
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