Ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere

Preface

It should be prefaced that the following is in no way to be interpreted contrary to the magisterial statement of Pope Pius XII in Humani Generis, in which he insists upon the possibility of God creating intellectual natures (humans and angels) without ordering them to the beatific vision. This insistence is important for ensuring our recognition of the gratuity of the supernatural order, a fact so emphasised by, amongst others, P. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P. To be sure, as Garrigou himself recognises, an intellectual creature such as man even naturally has a desire to see God face to face in the beatific vision, but, without grace, this desire remains conditional and inefficacious.

At any rate, the will's natural ordering towards universal good means that, implicitly, it calls out for, as it were, at least a natural knowledge and love of God (it might not possibly will these things, but I mean that God, at least naturally obtained, is objectively wherein the will's desire for good is found). The very nature of the will means that it cannot be satisfied with any good other than God. 

(The nature of the intellect means that it only reaches its greatest possible perfection when its object is God directly. And, when the cause of nature is known by the light of natural reason, a natural desire, albeit conditional and inefficacious, is elicited to see the essence of that cause in itself. Hence, the will can only be perfectly or totally satisfied - that is, so satisfied that nothing further is left to be desired or sought after - by God as obtained by a direct intellectual vision of his essence. With supernatural grace, which is at the same time very fitting for God to give but also free and gratuitous for him to choose to give, there is infused supernatural hope, a far loftier desire than the merely conditional and inefficacious natural desire for utterly perfect beatitude. The Beatific Vision is what 'perfect beatitude' consists in. Perfect beatitude is such a perfect good that so totally satisfies the appetite, that there is nothing else to be sought after. It turns out that such a beatitude is proper to the Divinity, and cannot be attained by an intellectual creature's natural powers. An intellectual creatures's level of natural beatitude or, more properly, felicitas is always capable of increase without reaching the immediate vision of the Divine Essence).

The Will's Appetite for Infinite Good

According to St Thomas, beatitudo can defined as "the perfect good of an intellectual nature" (ST Ia Q.26 a.1: Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae). Only in God, who possesses total perfection essentially, can there be an entire identification of esse and bonitas. Creatures are good secundum quid by merely existing, since their esse by itself is a certain good thing, but to be good simpliciter, they must acquire some further perfection or act (Ia Q.5 a.1). In physical things, the form perfects the matter as its first act, but the form itself is ordered towards operation as a further perfection. This is also true for angels, in whom there are distinctions between their essence, the actus essendi which actualises that essence, the powers that flows from that essence, and the operation which the angel is ordered towards as the perfection of its nature (Dionysius, Caelest. Hier., cap. XI: caelestes spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem, et operationem). Like God and angels, humans are intellectual, and like angels and material things, humans are creatures. Therefore, for humans, beatitude is a perfection to be acquired and an end to be obtained.

St Thomas calls beatitude a perfect good which totally satisfies the appetite (Ia IIae Q.2 a.8: Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum). Since beatitude is the perfection of an intellectual nature, we are here dealing with the rational appetite, the will. It is precisely because of the nature of the intellect and will that a being with intellect and will cannot be perfectly satisfied by anything other than God. The intellect presents to the will its fundamental and natural object, which is universal goodness (ibid: Obiectum autem voluntatis...est universale bonum). The will is a power of soul which is defined as being an appetitus for such an object. Because beatitude is a perfect good which totally satisfies the rational appetite, a good would not be beatitude si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum (ibid). And because the object of the rational appetite is universal goodness, it will not be totally satisfied with a good that falls short of universal goodness (Nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis nisi bonum universale). Therefore, any good that falls short of universal goodness will not be beatitude. St Thomas then says that the will's desire for bonum universale cannot be satisfied in anything created but only in God, since all creatures have only participated goodness (Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato sed solum in Deo: quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam). As was said above, only God is identical with his own goodness and possesses his entire goodness and perfection essentially. Everything created neither possesses its partial goodness of mere esse simpliciter essentially, nor its complete goodness. Its substantial act of esse is received from an extrinsic cause and its complete good is achieved by further perfection, namely the acquiring of any accidents necessary for its perfect operation, and ultimately by that perfect operation (Ia Q.6 a.3). This means that everything created possesses goodness by participation and not per se. Therefore, no created thing can be that in which is found the unqualified and unlimited goodness that alone can correspond to the will's appetite for universal goodness. The will's appetite for universal goodness is an appetite for goodness itself, which everything created participates in but falls short of. However, God is complete and unlimited goodness itself. As the argument of the Fourth Way goes, the maximum in any genus will be the cause of that genus. So also, the maximum in being and goodness will be the cause of all being and goodness. The maximum of goodness will be that which has goodness per se, which is the ultimate cause of anything which has participated goodness per aliud. Therefore, God is that which can totally satisfy the rational appetite (Ia IIae Q.3 a.1: ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere). The rational appetite is at rest at the attainment of this good, needing nothing else for its contentment: beatitudo perfecta...habet congregationem omnium bonorum per coniunctionem ad universalem fontem totius boni; non quod indigeat singulis particularibus bonis (Ia IIae Q.3 a.3 ad 2).

 

Summary

According to St Thomas Aquinas, man is of such a nature that he has an appetite for an infinite good. This is because he has an intellect that can conceive of universal goodness, and a will whose object is that unrestricted notion of goodness which the intellect presents to it. No finite, restricted, limited good can match up to such an appetite, so as to fully satiate it. Therefore, only the attainment of an infinite good can fully satiate it.

Whether Incontinence is a Sin

Incontinence / lack of self restraint is different from intemperance / licentiousness. The intemperate or licentious man is habitually disposed to seeking after excessive pleasures (to do with taste and touch). He decides that he should seek after pleasures that are in fact shameful and does so without regret. The incontinent man, however, realises that he shouldn’t seek such pleasures but he is overcome by his passions in the moment and does so anyway. 

The question arises whether the incontinent man sins. Although, intemperance is a worse sin, St Thomas affirms that he does (IIa IIae Q.156 a.2).

One objection has to do with power over one’s actions.

Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wisdom 8:21, "I know [Vulgate: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Another has to do with the involvement of reason in sin.

Objection 2. Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Reading Aristotle’s account of continence and incontinence (Nic. Eth. VII), where he explains what I described above, one might come away thinking these objections have merit. However, St Thomas replies decisively to these important objections.

Reply to Objection 1. Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing." Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."

Reply to Objection 2. The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

Further to the the reply to the second objection, we can add a saying of St Augustine, quoted by the Council of Trent: “God never commands the impossible, but, in commanding, He warns us to do what we are able and to ask Him for help to do that which we cannot” (Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. 11 (Denzinger, no. 804), from St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 41, no. 50.) This also reminds us what Jesus Christ said to St Paul: sufficit tibi gratia mea. “My grace is sufficient for you” (2 Corinthians 12:9). And again St Paul (1 Corinthians 10:13) says “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able: but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it.”

Furthermore, while the sin of the incontinent man is not as bad as the sin of the licentious man, that does not mean that it is venial, while that of the licentious man is mortal. In fact, the sin of the incontinent man or a sin of frailty can be mortal. While antecedent passion diminishes culpability, it does not destroy it (and on the contrary, consequent passion proper to the licentious man augments culpability). One can fully consent to the passion where one was free to utilise means that would have impeded it before giving into the passion. Garrigou-Lagrange explains in the Three Ages of the Interior Life:

“... But we must distinguish here the so-called antecedent passion, which precedes the consent of the will, and that called consequent, which follows it. Antecedent passion diminishes culpability, for it diminishes the liberty of judgment and of voluntary choice; it is particularly apparent in very impressionable people. On the contrary, consequent or voluntary passion does not lessen the gravity of sin, but augments it; or rather it is a sign that the sin is more voluntary, since the will itself arouses this inordinate movement of passion, as happens in a man who wishes to become angry the better to manifest his ill will. Just as a good consequent passion, such as Christ’s holy anger when He was driving the merchants from the Temple, increases the merit, so an evil consequent passion augments the demerit.

The sin of frailty, of which we are speaking here, is that in which the will yields to the impulse of an antecedent passion; and thereby the gravity of the sin is lessened. This does not mean, however, that it is never a mortal sin. It is truly mortal when the matter is grievous, and the sinner yields to passion with advertence and full consent. This is the case of homicide committed under the impulse of anger.

A person can resist, especially at the beginning, the inordinate movement of passion. If he does not resist it at the beginning as he ought, if he does not pray as he ought to obtain the help of God, passion is no longer simply antecedent, it becomes voluntary.

The sin of frailty, even when serious and mortal, is more pardonable than another, but here “pardonable” is by no means a synonym for “venial” in the current meaning of this word.

Even pious people ought to be attentive to this point for they may have unrepressed movements of jealousy which may lead them to grave faults: for example, to serious rash judgments and to words and exterior acts which are the cause of profound breaches, contrary both to justice and to charity.

It would be a gross error to think that only the sin of malice can be mortal because it alone implies the sufficient advertence, the full consent, together with the serious matter, necessary for the sin which gives death to the soul and renders it worthy of eternal death. Such an error would result from a badly formed conscience, and would contribute to increase this deformity. Let us remember that we can easily resist the beginning of the inordinate movement of passion, and that it is a duty for us to do so and also to pray for help, according to the words of St. Augustine, quoted by the Council of Trent:“God never commands the impossible, but, in commanding, He warns us to do what we are able and to ask Him for help to do that which we cannot.”

Let us add to this description of Garrigou-Lagrange what Our Lord Jesus Christ says about the efficacy of prayer in Luke Chapter 11: 

And I say to you, Ask, and it shall be given you: seek, and you shall find: knock, and it shall be opened to you. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. And which of you, if he ask his father bread, will he give him a stone? or a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent? Or if he shall ask an egg, will he reach him a scorpion? If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him?