“One gains a profoundly personal, selfish joy from the mere existence of the person one loves. It is one’s own personal, selfish happiness that one seeks, earns and derives from love,” so says Ayn Rand in The Virtue of Selfishness.
She also once remarked that there are three A’s who alone are worthy of her recommendation in the history of philosophy: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Ayn Rand. In fact, I believe that it is an insult to Aristotle and Aquinas to lump them together with her own depressing philosophy. That it is depressing should be manifest to most people. One may sometimes hear people claiming that we only really care about other people and other things for the selfish sake of ourselves. However, apart from followers of Ayn Rand (and even more troubling groups), they will say this without any enthusiasm, but rather as a sad brute fact that just objectively describes the raw, basic, and ignoble reality. Does Aristotle admit this supposed reality? Does he delight and glorify in it?
In fact, Aristotle is acutely aware of the nobility of loving others (those who are worthy of one’s love) for their own sake. It is noble and that is why it is depressing to admit its non-existence. Of course, the fact that it is noble means, therefore, that it is a noble good for the one loving. Hence, it is in no way against a good self of love, and, in fact, is in complete harmony with such a love of self. Such a harmony does not make this love of others superficial and ordered purely to self, as in the doctrine of Ayn Rand. Aristotle’s account of friendship is not egoism in disguise. Furthermore, his idea of friends as other selves does not make his account egoist, but in fact is a part of how he shows that egoism is not entailed by ‘eudaimonism.’ Also, while Aristotle thinks that love of self is primary and is the model of love of others, I believe that this is both reasonably argued and is consistent with a genuine love of others in themselves. His account of a virtuous love of self does present interesting questions, which I believe a proper understanding of the noble good can help us answer. Together, Aristotle’s ideas of union and of the noble help us to understand loving others for their own sake.
Because there are three kinds of things that are loveable, Aristotle sees that there are three fundamental ways we can have love in relation to other people. In Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, he describes how ‘the loveable’ (τὸ φιλητόν) can be ‘good’ (ἀγαθὸν), ‘pleasant’ (ἡδὺ), or ‘useful’ (χρήσιμον). However, Aristotle would not deny that people desire the pleasant as good (indeed, for its own sake) and desire the useful as good. A good is desired as useful when it is desired for the sake of another good. Aristotle discusses such derivative and secondary goods in Book 1. Clearly, something is good in a higher sense insofar as it is sought after as an end (and is a good in the highest sense if it is sought after only as an end). As he says many times, including in 8.2, the pleasant is loved as an end. But he also says here that ‘the good’ is loved as an end.
What he means by ‘good’ here, as contrasted with the pleasant and the useful, is ‘good’ in a special sense, and it is, in fact, what I shall refer to as the noble good.[1] I call it this because it seems to be identifiable with a fundamental concept in Aristotle’s philosophy: τὸ καλόν. This term can be translated as ‘the beautiful’ and ‘the noble.’ Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics,[2] this appears as something emphatically final. It is also described as what the rational part of man aims at for its own sake. It is what ὀρθός λόγος recognises as fundamentally good. It is grasped by the νοῦς. For example, the courageous man will endure very frightening things “in the way that he ought and as reason commands, for the sake of the noble (τὸ καλόν), for this is the end of virtue” (3.7, 1115b12-13). Our idea of ‘beautiful’ can help us understand this term. When we find something beautiful, we love it for its own intrinsic beauty, and therefore delight in it. I have translated it as ‘the noble’ because it is especially used by Aristotle to refer to intelligible beauty.
Before we return to the noble in the context of love and self-love, let us consider what I will call imperfect friendships. There are relationships that are called by the name of friendships which are established for the sake of utility or pleasure. These are not friendships in the strict sense (κυρίως) but only by a certain similitude (ὁμοιότητα), as opposed to those friendships of good human beings insofar as they are good (8.4, 1157a29-32). He is also very clear that “those who love each other on account of utility do not love each other in themselves, but only insofar as they come have something good from the other; and it is similar with those who love on account of pleasure, for people are fond of those who are witty, not because they are of a certain sort, but because they are pleasant to them” (8.3, 1156a10-14). Wittiness is a virtue and is intrinsic to the person who has it; but the cause of the quasi-friendship is not delighting in that intrinsic virtue, insofar as it is a perfection within that person, but rather the cause is the pleasure received by the person simply insofar as it pleases him. What the quasi-friend ultimately loves then, insofar as this imperfect friendship is concerned, is the pleasure that his quasi-friend causes rather than something intrinsically good about the person himself. Hence, “these are friendships accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός); for it is not for being what he is that the person loved is loved, but only insofar as he provides, in the one case, something good, or, in the other, pleasure” (ibid 1156a16-19). As has been said, the useful, insofar as it useful, is simply that which is desired for the sake of a higher good. The motive of the friendship of utility is some exterior good (or goods) to which that association is ordered, whereas the motive of the perfect friendship (τελεία φιλία, 8.3, 1156b6; that of the good insofar as they are good), is the good residing in the friend himself. The virtue and goodness of this friend are noble and beautiful, and so intrinsically loveable.
The starting point of friendship is said to be εὔνοια (‘goodwill’; 9.5, 1167a3-4). Is there a form of εὔνοια that corresponds to the imperfect friendships? In fact, Aristotle refuses to recognise εὔνοια corresponding to imperfect friendships (ibid, 1167a12-14). This is because εὔνοια results from perceiving some good in someone (cf. ibid, 1167a18-20) and, on this basis, desires good things for that person because he is good, whereas friendships of pleasure and utility are for the sake of exterior goods. He says that even “he who wishes that another fare well”, and so does desire good things for that person, but only “because he hopes to be well taken care of by this person” does not properly “have εὔνοια towards him but rather toward himself” (ibid, 1167a15-17). When he says that εὔνοια seems to be the starting point of friendship, then, this it to be taken as the starting point of perfect friendships. Is there absolutely no εὔνοια possible in friendships of pleasure and utility? This would not seem to follow because, since εὔνοια is only a principle of perfect friendship and does not necessarily entail it, it is possible for some sort of εὔνοια based upon some sort of good perceived in someone to coincide with friendships of utility and pleasure (without those friendships necessarily turning into perfect friendships). But this εὔνοια would not serve as the cause or principle of those friendships of utility or pleasure – rather the exterior goods sought after are the causes or principles.
To counter the claim that Aristotle’s account of perfect friendship is egoistic, we could point out the several times Aristotle repeats the claim that, in such friendships, a friend x will love a friend y in himself because y is good in himself and will wish good things to y for y’s sake (eg. 8.3, 1156b8-10). Someone wishes his friends good things for his friends’ sake (ἐκείνων ἕνεκα) because they are good in themselves (καθ' αὑτούς), since, as was said, the good is loveable.
Again, this is the noble good. There is something intrinsically beautiful, and therefore loveable, in the soul of the friend. And it is not hard to understand that such love of complacency (loving the good in itself) inspires love of benevolence (desiring good to the loved).
Everyone seeks the good and εὐδαιμονία in the broad sense. When the broad sense of εὐδαιμονία in Nicomachean Ethics 1.4 is defined simply as ‘doing well and living well’, this is rather all encompassing. The term ‘well’ (εὖ) is as broad and general as ‘good.’ Any act we choose to do must be considered as a good act for us to do. People disagree about what ‘doing well and living well’ actually entail. But, nevertheless, from this, it follows that everyone must love themselves in some sense. It is manifest that those who place their last end in sensible pleasures or external good love themselves in some form. They desire sensible pleasures or external goods for themselves. However, those who recognise that the last end is to be found in the goods of the soul will both love themselves and will be capable of loving others for their own sakes. Why is that? Because loving others for their own sakes could be a noble activity of the soul, and therefore fall under ‘acting well and living well,’ which is the most universal ratio under which man must act. Nevertheless, even if one loves and delights in the intrinsic good of the other person, in and of itself, this would still be good for the one loving (assuming that this loving of the other is noble and fitting) and noble for them (because they are doing it). If someone chooses to live and act well and does so in the right way, then this makes them noble and perfects them. Therefore, desiring to love your friends for their own sakes entails loving something noble for yourself. But, considered so far, the fact that the loving is noble for the one loving appears as a necessary consequence, rather than necessarily what is directly intended and focused upon by the person loving.[3] But can the person reflexively turn in on the nobility of the loving of a friend and the doing of good to a friend, and delight in those things? Yes. He can delight, first of all, in their intrinsic nobility, and, then also, in that nobility as applied to themselves. They can delight in the nobility as applied to themselves because they love the noble thing in and of itself and they love themselves; therefore, they can delight to see the noble thing in themselves.
Why do they love themselves? Given that we are talking about the virtuous person here, a key answer is that the virtuous person loves himself because he is virtuous. Corrupt people are depressed with themselves because “since they possess nothing lovable, they feel in no way friendly towards themselves” (9.4, 11166b17-18). However, the virtuous person has something truly loveable in himself and something loveable in a final, not merely a useful, way: the noble. The virtuous person will love virtuous people, virtue and virtuous actions universally, and virtue and virtuous actions in virtuous people – these are all noble and intrinsically loveable. Aristotle says that “the σπουδαῖος person, insofar as he is σπουδαῖος, delights in actions that accord with virtue and is disgusted by those that stem from vice, just as the musical person is pleased by beautiful melodies and pained by bad ones” (9.10, 1170a8-11). This clearly provides ample explanatory power for why the virtuous person loves himself, his virtues, and his actions in themselves, and loves his virtuous friends, their virtues and their actions in themselves. These are all intrinsically loveable and noble.
But why does Aristotle think that the good man loves himself most of all and desires what is noble for himself most of all? This is because intensity of love depends on the level of unity. Each man is most united to himself. He is one substance with himself and the same person as himself. Furthermore, the good man has ὁμόνοια with himself most of all: “this decent person is of like mind with himself and longs for the same things with his whole soul” (9.4, 1166a13- 14). He also shares in sufferings and joys with himself most of all (ibid, 1166a27-29).
Along with the concept of the noble good, the concept of union is the other key part of Aristotle’s account of friendship that I wish to highlight. Aristotle says of perfect friends that “in loving their friend, they love what is good for themselves, since the good friend becomes a good for the person to whom he is the friend” (8.5, 1157a33-4). He also calls a friend “another self” (ἄλλος αὐτός; eg. 9.4, 1166a31-32). Does this undermine what I have said about loving friends for their own sakes? I do not think so. Quite the opposite. This helps us understand why friends love and wish good things for their friends’ sake so intensely. Furthermore, when Aristotle describes the friend as becoming a good of his friend, he does not mean a useful good but a noble good. The friend is not a merely instrumental utility desired for some ulterior motive. Rather, the whole being of the friend is encompassed and loved as an extension of oneself. Is it just oneself one is loving? Not entirely because the friend does remain a distinct person! But the person of the friend is so united to his friend that what is good for each friend is a good for the other.
The importance of union for the love of friendship and how the level of unity determines the level of intensity is seen also in Aristotle’s description of the loves of parents for their children, children for their parents, siblings for each other, and relatives for each other. For example, he says that “parents feel affection for their children on the grounds that they are something of their own, whereas children feel affection for their parents on the grounds that they themselves are something that comes from them... (8.12, 1161b18-19). Aristotle uses language of union to demonstrate the level of love: “the begetter feels more united (συνωκείωται) in kinship to its offspring than does the offspring to its maker... (ibid 21). Furthermore, like in the description of friends as other selves, Aristotle says that “parents love children as they love themselves, for those who come from them are like other selves (ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ) separately existing” (ibid 27- 29). In a lower but still strong degree, there is unity and a corresponding level of intensity of love between siblings: “brothers [or perhaps to be translated generally as ‘siblings’] love each other because they were born from the same parents” (ibid 30-31). What’s more, we have the same motif used to explain the love of the benefactor for those he has benefited. Benefactors love those they benefit in a way analogous to how poets love their poems “and feel affection for them just as if they were their children” because “in his activity, the maker of something somehow is the work; he therefore feels affection for the work because he feels affection for his own existence” (9.7, 1167b31-1168a9).
To conclude, I have used two important concepts to help us understand Aristotle on friendship and love: the doctrine of the noble good and the doctrine of union. These shed light on Aristotle’s views on friendship and love, which the likes of Ayn Rand and Martin Luther failed to apprehend. Therefore, the former fell into an extreme egoism and the latter was convinced that all love of self is evil (though unavoidable). “It is an error to maintain that Aristotle’s statement concerning happiness does not contradict Catholic doctrine,” wrote Martin Luther in his, often overlooked, theses against Scholasticism. Indeed, “virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace” according to him. Both these views I see as exceptionally pessimistic and depressing. And furthermore, for me, the three A’s will always be Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. Now, ignoring the manifest axes to grind in the introduction and conclusion, I hope that my actual focus on Aristotle has shown that his account of friendship is not egoism in disguise. Of course, he does believe that the good person will love himself (specifically the higher part of himself, his νοῦς) most of all, but that does not entail that he only ultimately loves himself for his own sake. He is more unified to himself than anyone else and Aristotle emphasises that the level of unity determines the level of intensity of one’s love. However, those who are unified to him in different degrees will be loved in and of themselves, and good will be desired for them for their own sakes, with an intensity corresponding to that degree of unity.
[1] Thanks to the thought and development of Cicero, Pseudo-Dionysius, St Ambrose, St Augustine, St Isidore and St Thomas Aquinas, we find this evolve into what became in the Scholastic tradition the bonum honestum.
[2] It is also found throughout the Aristotelian corpus eg. De Partibus Animalium 1.5; De Generatione Animalium 2.1.
[3] The good act will still be willed insofar as it is a good thing for the person to do, as any act must. But this ratio is all encompassing and does not necessitate a focus on self, other than implying, of course, the agency of the person doing the act (anything we wish to do must be something we wish ourselves to do).
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