Contemplation (θεωρία) plays a central role in Aristotle’s account of εὐδαιμονία. In fact, he says that θεωρία is the highest εὐδαιμονία. What does he mean by this? What does this mean for the moral virtues? Such questions have caused controversy, interpretational difficulties, and many attempts to tackle them. My account of how Aristotle sees the relationship between θεωρία and εὐδαιμονία relies upon my understanding of the principles from whence Aristotle derives his understanding of this relationship. When one understands these principles, which concern Aristotle’s views on man, the divine, natural teleology, the noble, νοῦς, and εὐδαιμονία, I believe that a lot becomes clear.
What is εὐδαιμονία? Perhaps we can begin with its etymology. It literally means a state of being ‘well-daimoned.’ Is the idea here that a daimon, some form of divinity is well disposed towards you? This seems so. Aristotle, in Book VIII of the Eudemian Ethics, distinguished two kinds of εὐτυχία: a divine kind, which is when this fortunate man gets things right διὰ θεὸν, and another kind which is more like ‘chance’, where the fortunate man happens to get hold of good fortune despite his impulses, and only accidentally (hence it is not continuous). We might also say, though, that εὐδαιμονία involves the εὐδαίμων person being well disposed towards the divine. Indeed, the εὐδαιμονία of someone is found in the ἐνέργεια of the εὐδαίμων person’s soul, while the fact that the divine is well-disposed to the εὐδαίμων person seems to be more of a cause of this. At any rate, εὐδαιμονία is something thoroughly divine in where it comes from and where it goes to. Interestingly, Aristotle talks about how the person who is “active in accord with the intellect (νοῦς), who cares for this, and is in the best condition regarding it” is most dear to the gods (θεοφιλέστατος), on the grounds that he is most like the gods and it is reasonable for the gods to delight in what is best and most akin to them (NE 10.8, 1179a22-27).
There is a recurring emphasis throughout the Aristotelian corpus on the central idea that all creatures seek to imitate the divine – even become the divine – so far as it lies in their power. The various limitations of various things mean that there are different levels and kinds of imitation. Human beings have νοῦς, and this makes them very special indeed. This is the highest faculty and the most divine in human beings. Just like everything else, the perfection of human beings lies in them imitating the divine so far as is possible for them, and since the νοῦς is the highest and most divine, this must at least entail perfecting the νοῦς as far as possible. The so called ‘function argument’ in Nichomachean Ethics 1.7 is often misinterpreted as boiling down to what is unique to man, when in fact the argument has to do with showing that there is a good functioning of man qua man given man’s essence, such that we can judge whether or to what extent a human being is fulfilling the perfection (proximity to the divine) which man is capable of. This is made clear in 10.7, where Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea that man’s good functioning has to do with what is merely unique to man. Indeed, φρόνησις and the moral virtues are unique to man, but θεωρία, which is shared with the gods, is better. Man should not simply strive for what he happens to have that other things don’t have. Rather, as with everything in the universe, man should strive to imitate the divine so far as he is capable. His capabilities follow his essence and the highest and the most divine thing that his essence allows is θεωρία. So, Aristotle says: “one ought not – as some recommend – to think only about human things because one is a human being, nor only about mortal things because one is mortal, but rather to make oneself immortal, insofar as that is possible, and to do all that bears on living in accord with what is the most excellent of the things in oneself” (NE 10.7, 1177b31-34).
When Aristotle calls νοῦς the most divine of the things in us at Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, he also says that it concerns the most noble and divine objects: ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων (1177a15). This accords with the end of Eudemian Ethics VIII, where Aristotle talks explicitly about contemplation of God as the highest activity (τὴν τοῦ θείου θεωρίαν). Furthermore, in Nichomachean Ethics 6.7, Aristotle describes the intellectual virtue of wisdom (σοφία) as intellection (νοῦς in the sense of a grasp of principles) and science (ἐπιστήμη) of the most honourable things (τῶν τιμιωτάτων). It is obvious that the virtue which θεωρία corresponds to is σοφία. Aristotle emphasises that σοφία is higher than φρόνησις. The virtue of φρόνησις just concerns human matters but human beings are not the best things in existence (NE 6.7, 1141a20-22), for “there are other things whose nature is much more divine than that of a human being” (ibid 1141a34-1141b1).
One way of describing εὐδαιμονία is acting well and living well. What it means for human beings to act and live well will depend on the acts of those faculties whereby man can imitate the divine. But also, what it means for human beings to act and live well will depend on the circumstances. Because we are composed of body and soul, certain circumstances mean that acting and living well include what are called the moral virtues, the ἀρεταὶ ἠθικαὶ. These moral virtues dispose the good human being to act well in the relevant moments. This acting well is defined by achieving a certain μέσον – a right amount or a right determination. This μέσον is prescribed by right reason (ὀρθός λόγος) and right reason seeks τὸ καλόν – the noble, the beautiful, the honestum. Aristotle says that “the σπουδαῖος person, insofar as he is σπουδαῖος, delights in actions that accord with virtue and is disgusted by those that stem from vice, just as the musical person is pleased by beautiful melodies and pained by bad ones” (9.10, 1170a8-11). It is Aristotle’s conviction that, because of their intrinsic nobility, these actions are chosen for their own sake within those circumstances, but that those circumstances are not so final and choice worthy for their own sakes (cf. NE 10.7, 1177b4-20). What those circumstances are ordered towards is a state that is most final and in which man can maximise that which is best in him without any further concern. This most final activity of man is θεωρία (contemplation), the most perfect activity of that which is most perfect in man, the νοῦς. In a time of war, when the opportunity arises of action in accordance with the moral virtue of ἀνδρεία, a human being can act in accordance with the vice of cowardice and flee the danger, or choose what is noble in the moment, on the grounds that it is noble, and thus act courageously. However, the circumstances that gave rise to this act of courage are not final and ultimate. The war was not raised for its own sake. Rather, as Aristotle says, war is ordered towards peace, as also politics is to σχολή (leisure). But, in times of σχολή, an even better activity is apt, that is θεωρία.
When Aristotle contrasts the practical and contemplative lives in Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, what should be understood by this are the lives dominated by the practical or by contemplation. The first is a life where φρόνησις and the moral virtues are dominant, whereas the second is where σοφία and, its activity, θεωρία are dominant. Aristotle calls the contemplative life εὐδαιμονέστατος (NE 10.7, 1178a8), while he calls the morally good practical life εὐδαίμων in a secondary sense (δευτέρως; 10.8, 1178a9). This practical life, where the moral virtues are maximised and most conspicuous, is εὐδαίμων in the sense that the person acts well and as he ought in the circumstances in which he is involved. It happens that the circumstances which his life is centred around are ones that focus on the practical side of life, rather than the contemplative side of life. That the life that focuses on θεωρία is more εὐδαίμων and, in fact, εὐδαιμονέστατος is apparent from what has been discussed above, as well as the several arguments Aristotle gives for the superiority of θεωρία in 10.7. Aristotle is not suggesting that the man who lives this contemplative life will never practice moral virtue. The point is that, as opposed to the man who lives the discussed practical life, he has much less opportunity for exhibiting the moral virtues (cf. 10.8, 1178a23-34). However, he still has a body and requires external things. To the extent that he engages in the practical realm in order to meet the needs entailed by these, he must act according to moral virtue. Hence, Aristotle says: “But insofar as he is a human being and lives together with a number of others, he chooses to do what accords with virtue [viz. moral virtue]” (10.8, 1178b5-7).
Why must he act in accordance with moral virtues in those circumstances? He must act so in order to be a good man.Even if θεωρία is the best activity and a better activity than those of the moral virtues, it remains true that the moral vices would render one to be a bad, shameful, ignoble, blameworthy, and not good man. Therefore, in order to be act well and live well in those circumstances where one can be virtuous or vicious, and hence to act in accordance with εὐδαιμονία, one must act in accordance with the relevant moral virtues.
Is there something in the nature of θεωρία that entails that one would act in accordance with the moral virtues where they are relevant? Whether or not is not so important because it is true about φρόνησις and Aristotle says that φρόνησις is required for σοφία (cf. NE 6.12). In 6.13, Aristotle ties together φρόνησις and moral virtues, saying that the one cannot exist without the other. We could ask the question why fundamentally the φρόνιμος person would choose the moral virtues and choose to obtain and exercise σοφία. The reason is that φρόνησις is the perfection of practical reason and practical reason chooses actions in accordance with what is noble. The actions pertaining to the moral virtues are chosen because they are noble, and σοφία and θεωρία are noble and concern the most noble things.
As opposed to the emphasis in the Nichomachean Ethics on the centrality of σοφία and θεωρία, in the Eudemian Ethics Book VIII, the highest virtue is said to be καλοκἀγαθία. This virtue might be taken to be just an aggregate of all other virtues. However, I think that this would make little sense. How could a single virtue be many virtues? On the other hand, we could see clearly enough how a single virtue could be the root and cause of the other virtues. Therefore, I think that καλοκἀγαθία is best understood as being a fundamental disposition of the rational appetite in loving and choosing what is noble. Therefore, καλοκἀγαθία would be a disposition towards the noble qua noble. As Aristotle says, “one is καλός κ'ἀγαθός because goods that are noble are his on their own account and because he is the sort who does noble actions also for their own sake. And the goods that are noble are virtues and virtuous actions.” (Eudemian Ethics 8.3.6). In fact, καλοκἀγαθία plays the role of caritas in St Thomas Aquinas as the forma, motor, and radix of all other virtues. This virtue would also dispose one most of all to the highest activity, θεωρία, and, since θεωρία concerns the noblest and highest things, these are the ones most especially the objects of love. The central role of καλοκἀγαθία, which I believe is implicitly a natural form of love of God[1], makes for a more integrated structure to the organism of the virtues, because it serves as a common root of θεωρία and the moral virtues. Nevertheless, it still allows room for a high importance to be placed in θεωρία. Indeed, it would seem that the love of the noble would render one to favour contemplating the noblest. Indeed, that θεωρία would be the preferred activity of one who was καλός κ'ἀγαθός is evident from the end of the Eudemian Ethics: “So, whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods (either goods of the body or money or friends or other goods) will most effectively produce contemplation of God, that is the best and this is the finest limit; and whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods impedes, either by deficiency or by excess, our cultivation and contemplation of God is base” (ibid 8.3.16).
Since εὐδαιμονία is living well and acting well and the activity of θεωρία is that in which man lives and acts the best, θεωρία will be the highest εὐδαιμονία. Since εὐδαιμονία is goodness considered as a final end and as perfect, and θεωρία is the most final and perfect activity, θεωρία will be that in which εὐδαιμονία is most properly found. Since εὐδαιμονία is activity (ἐνέργεια) in accordance with virtue, and since, according to Aristotle, θεωρία is the activity of the highest virtue (σοφία), εὐδαιμονία is especially found in θεωρία. Since θεωρία is the most perfect activity of that which is most divine in man (the νοῦς), θεωρία would be that by which man most of all imitates the divine. However, even when considering the emphasis on the centrality of σοφία and θεωρία in the Nicomachean Ethics, we can see that this no way completely throws aside the moral virtues, since they are necessarily connected by φρόνησις. And φρόνησις seeks always what is noble, which is really what is divine or most participative in and reflective of the divine. As Plutarch says, μέτρον γὰρ τοῦ βίου τὸ καλόν (Consolatio ad Apollonium 111.D.4)
[1] Perhaps suggested in Eudemian Ethics 8.3.15: “God is not a commander in the sense of giving orders but as that for the sake of which prudence gives orders.” οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλ ̓ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει. Cf. also Metaphysics Λ7.
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